Forced Migration in West Siberia

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Abstract

This paper examines the flow and regional distribution of forced migrants from the Former Soviet Republics in Central Asia to West Siberia, and the problems they face there, focusing on housing and employment. The forced migrants in West Siberia had few options to choose in their direction of migration. Furthermore, while they are expected to ease regional depopulation and promote regional economic development, they faced housing and employment problems after their resettlement in West Siberia, which are obstacles to the rational utilization of forced migrants for regional expectations. In conclusion, this paper suggests that employment generation and public orientation to their employment are crucial for successful resettlement of the forced migrants. JEL classification number: J61, J15, R23, 2 Figures, 7 Tables, 41 references.

Keywords: Forced Migration, West Siberia, Resettlement, Housing, Employment

1. Introduction

Every state border, every border region, is unique. This is the statement with which Anderson and O’Dowd started their article (Anderson and O’Dowd, 1999, p.594). The meaning and significance of state borders can vary dramatically over space and time, as one region is separated into a few states or a few states are integrated into one state by force or with consent. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was legally separated into independent states when Belarus, the Russian Federation, and the Ukraine signed an agreement in Minsk on 8th December 1991. Soon after, on 21st December 1991 in Almaty, the rest of Union’s republics assented to the dissolution of the Soviet Union declared in Minsk. Independence of the Union’s republics consequently made West Siberia a border region neighboring independent Kazakhstan.

Among immigrants from the former Union republics, those from the former Union republics in

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Central Asia and the Caucasus have constituted 70% to 90% of the immigration into Russia during the 1990s. Ethnic Russians made up 60% of the immigrants from the aforementioned regions, and 70% of the immigrants from Kazakhstan were Russian in 1998. These Russians are return migrants.

“Return migration” refers to migrants returning to their home country from their host country to resettle (Perez-Itriago & Guendelman, 1989, p. 269). They had various motivations for returning to their home country, including family reasons, such as the children’s schooling, longing to see the family, and the need to look after elderly relations. Other reasons included retirement; difficulties encountered at work and insoluble problems of integration into the social fabric of the host country; achievement of the original purpose for migrating to the host country; job possibilities back in the home country; and setting up their own businesses. Private reasons included homesickness, health problems, the death of relations, inheritance, marriage and so on; and, deportation and expulsion by migration law (Conde, 1989, pp. 327-328, UN, 1998, p. 156).

Forced migrants are counted among these return migrants. In Russia, the people uprooted from the other countries for ethnic, religious, linguistic, political, or ideological reasons are called forced migrants (Вынужденные Мигранты). Forced migration is divided into two categories: Forced Resettlers (Вынужденные Переселенцы) and Refugees (Беженцы). Forced Resettlers are forced migrants who have Russian citizenship, while Refugees are forced migrants who do not have Russian citizenship. Most of the forced migrants in Russia are from the CIS countries outside the Russian Federation, and of all forced migrants in Russia registered from 1992 to 1998, those from the former Soviet republics in Central Asia accounted for about 78% (Goskomstat, 2001, p. 129). These are also migrants uprooted from their host countries, so they have a very close destiny to that of refugees.

In this paper, we examine the regional distribution of forced migrants from the former Soviet countries in Central Asia including Kazakhstan, and the conditions of their resettlement in West Siberia. While it is well known many ethnic Russians have returned to Russia since the collapse of the former USSR, their living conditions in Siberia have not been well surveyed because it is still difficult to keep track the official statistics and research works in Siberia. We have intensively surveyed the official statistical data in Novosibirsk Province, one of the border provinces, and works in West Siberia. This paper will contribute to the understanding of the following issues: 1) The forced migrants from the former Soviet Union republics in Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan, into West Siberia had little choice their direction of migration. 2) While they are expected to ease regional depopulation problems and promote regional economic development, they faced housing and employment problems in their new homes in West Siberia. 3) Public support for their employment is crucial for directing forced migrants to their resettlement places.

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1 In this paper, we often use the term “forced migrants” to refer to Russian forced resettlers. “Forced migrants” of course include forced resettlers and refugees, but the number of refugees was small, and some statistical data were provided with only a division of forced migrants or only forced resettlers. Only when we have to accent the division between forced resettlers and refugees, we use the term “forced resettlers” in this paper.
2. Exit to Siberia as an option for Ethnic Russians in Border Regions

After the independence of former Soviet republics in 1991, 25 million ethnic Russians remained in the new states outside the Russian Federation, and they became minorities in these countries. For Kazakhstan, Russian minority issues are more complex and relatively more important for the future viability and democratization of Kazakhstan (Chinn & Kaiser, 1996, p.185). Almost a quarter of the Russians outside the Russian Federation remain in Kazakhstan (6.2 million Russians remain there). It is the second largest share of Russian minorities in the former Soviet republics (Ukraine is the first).

The severe conditions ethnic Russians face in Kazakhstan can be traced with the term “De-Russification,” which consists of the restrictions on Russian languages, the eradication of Russian minorities from the memories of Kazakhstan, and the exclusion of Russian minorities from high positions in Kazakhstan. The economic decline of Kazakhstan reinforced their severe conditions.

For the ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, the return to the Russian Federation was not considered to be the only option for escaping the severe situation after Kazakhstan’s independence.

Hagendoorn, Linssen & Tumanov (2001, pp.9-14) explained three options that Russian minorities could choose in these conditions: Exit, Passing, and Voice. The Exit option includes two choices: one is individual emigration to the “motherland.” The other is the exit as a group by secession from the existing state. The former is the option we focus on in this paper. The latter option is an ethno-political movement often observed in the northern part of Kazakhstan where a concentrated Russian minority remains. The Passing option means the assimilation into a titular group and the effort of adjustment required to be accepted by the titular group. This option demands the ethnic Russians redefine themselves as members of the titular nation, erasing any trace of a prior Russian or Soviet identity. The language barrier and social ties are important in this phase. If they are already fluent in the indigenous language and need not further effort to adjust their circumstances of the indigenous social ties, they may pass for members of the titular group (hereafter called “titulars”). However, the regional concentration of the ethnic Russian population has made these efforts difficult. The Voice is the alternative option for escape from the lack of status of a minority position. It is the collective attempt to change the position of the Russian minority group and receive recognition from the titulars with more moderate political instruments than secessionists.

The so-called “harmonization” the Kazakh government has embarked on would create conditions in Kazakhstan under which the ethnic Russians would more likely integrate into the identity of the Kazakh State. The government tried to accomplish this kind of “harmonization” via authoritarian instruments such as the replacement of administration cadres in ethnic-Russian-dominated regions. They also attempted to stimulate Kazakh return migration from the other Central Asian countries for resettlement in ethnic-Russian-dominated regions, and to propagate Kazakh national heritage by prompting a national language movement (Bremmer, 1994, p.621).

Although ethnic tension between ethnic Russians and titulars was strong, ultimately ethnicity failed to function as a political resource to mobilize ethnic Russians, and the potential regional
challenge in the north, based on ethno-political identities, faded as Melvin suggested (Melvin, 2002, p.177). This was because the central government pursued a strong political approach for forming a unitary Kazakh state by steadily increasing control over the Russian-dominated northern provinces, while ethnic Russian communities in the north were fragmented in terms of ethnic identity. Many ethnic Russians are second- and third-generation residents and most feel strongly that they are natives of northern Kazakhstan (Bremer, 1994, p.620). Their identities were set on “Sovietness” rather than ethnic Russian identity. Kazakh nationalism had, in fact, seriously limited the achievement of their political goal as a unitary Kazakh state by Kazakhization, but the Russian ethno-political movement could not gain their unity as a political movement; the ethnic tension still remains. Consequently, the preferred option for Russians became “Exit” by emigration to the Russian Federation, and not “Voice” in an increasingly repressive and neo-traditional Kazakhized regime. (Hughes & Sasse, 2002, p.30)

This means that we should not expect the return migrants from Kazakhstan to Siberia to come back with nostalgia for their “motherland.” According to a survey conducted in Western Kazakhstan by Karzhaubaeva (2002, p.63), the major reason ethnic Russians wanted to leave there was “the absence of perspective for their children” (37.5%); “the isolation from their motherland” was a minor reason for them (7.5%). Nor was economic motivation a major reason to immigrate to Russia. Their motivation came from the ethnic minority factor in Kazakhstan, as Moiseev (2002, p71) suggested. The official statistics in Novosibirsk Province also support this fact. As Table 1 shows, going home was not a major reason for all immigrants to come to Novosibirsk Province. Except for “private and family reasons,” “international affairs” was the major reason for immigration to Novosibirsk Province. This general tendency suggested that ethnic Russians’ most important reason for migration into Russia might not be to return to their “motherland”; ethnic tension and the Kazakh central government’s strong drive for de-Russification made ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan rely on the Russian Federation for protection. It has created numerous forced resettlers from Kazakhstan to West Siberia.

| Table 1. Reasons to immigrate to Novosibirsk (16 years old and over, 1998) |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                                 | All             | Education       | Work            | Homeward        | International   | Disorder,Disasters & Disadjustment | Private and Family reasons | others |
| Central Asia                    | 9098            | 735             | 977             | 565             | 2029            | 229             | 3834            | 729       |
| %                               | 100             | 8.1             | 10.7            | 6.2             | 22.3            | 2.5             | 42.1            | 8         |
| Kazakhstan                      | 7672            | 671             | 815             | 455             | 1746            | 205             | 3203            | 577       |
| %                               | 100             | 8.7             | 10.6            | 5.9             | 22.8            | 2.8             | 41.7            | 7.5       |

Note: Central Asia includes Kazakhstan in this table.

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2 Poppe & Hagendoorn (2001, p.58) suggested the following, “In the Soviet era, national and ethnic identification among Russians was less predominant than the supra-national Soviet identity. Surveys conducted shortly before the dissolution of the USSR show that more than two-thirds of Russians, no matter where they resided, indicated that the Soviet Union, not Russia, was their “motherland.” Studies conducted after the dissolution of the Soviet Union showed that the Soviet identity was still present among Russians in the near abroad. “Furthermore” as Polat (2002, p.82) warned, the homogeneity of the Russian Diaspora, with a strong national identity, is in fact an assumption that needs to be treated with caution.
What the forced migrants could choose in Kazakhstan was de facto just an exit option to Russia. The conditions they faced in West Siberia, however, where a large share of them resettled, have been rather uncomfortable. In a sense, they are “homeless” in both countries. To trace their “homeless state of mind,” we will focus on the forced migrants moving from Central Asia into West Siberia.

3. Forced Migrants as a Buffer against Depopulation?

Net migration into Russia contributed to easing the natural population decrease in the first half of the 1990s, but this did not occur to the same extent in the second half of the 1990s because the net number immigrants has drastically decreased since the peak in 1994 (Figure 1).

![Figure 1 Natural Population Decrease, Net Migrants, and Forced Migrants in Russia](source)

The number of forced migrants has also drastically decreased since 1996. The number of forced migrants into Russia amounted to 287,000 people in 1993 and 272,000 in 1995, but it decreased by 99,000 in 1996. The number of forced migrants has been declining further year by year. The first law on forced migration was enacted in 1993, but it was too general and vague to
clarify the difference between refugees and forced migrants. Russia enacted its law without posturing against the steadily increasing number of forced migrants from the former Soviet republics. Replying to the need to eliminate discrepancies and weak points in migration regulation, an improved law on forced migrants was enacted on December 28, 1995. This improved law has the same overall structure as the 1993 version, but it clarified the definition of forced migrants and rigidified the conditions needed to obtain the status of forced migrants. The new version of the law took effect in 1996, and quickly resulted in a sharp decline in the number of forced migrants into Russia. It is difficult to ascertain how changes in the law might make the potential forced migrants reluctant to apply for the status of forced migrant. However, it may be true that, as Helton & Voronina (200, pp.130-131) argued, it often led to the loss of the right to receive forced migrant status. Another reason to make them to be reluctant to do so was that there was little economic incentive accompanied with obtaining the status, compared with the period from 1992 to 1994 (Florinskaia & Kirillova, p.128).

The drastic decrease in forced migration after 1996 leads to the fact not only net migration, but also forced migration has had little effect against Russia’s natural population decrease, at least in the latter half of the 1990s. For West Siberia, however, forced migration from former Soviet

\footnote{The conditions required to obtain the status of forced migrants can be seen at Article 2 in the law. This article defines the cases in which a person cannot obtain forced migrants status.}
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republics has been rather effective for easing the population decrease. As Figure 2 shows the case of Novosibirsk Province, compared with the overall figures for Russia, net migration from former Soviet republics has offset the natural population decrease, and the share of forced migrants among net migrants was relatively larger.

Not only from the perspective of natural population decrease, but also from the perspective of depopulation by inter-regional migration, the net migrants and especially forced migrants from former Soviet republics are contributing to population growth in West Siberia.

Russia’s inter-regional migration pattern can be characterized by the term “Westward tendency.” The matrix of inter-regional migration flow in 1998 (Table 2) shows a strong westward tendency for inter-regional population flow. The regions of population out-flow are the North region, Northern Caucasus, West Siberia, East Siberia, and the Far East regions. On the other hand, the Central region, Northwest, Volga-Vyatka, Central Black Earth, Volga, and the Ural regions have been population inflow regions; in particular, the Central, Northwest, and Central Black Earth regions extensively absorbed the populations of other regions. Therefore, strong inter-regional migration flow from East to West, i.e., periphery to center, can be seen in Russia, at least in the 1990s.

Table 2 Net interregional flow of Population in 1998 (people)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In North Region</th>
<th>North West</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Volga-Vyatka</th>
<th>Central Black Earth</th>
<th>Volga</th>
<th>North Caucasus</th>
<th>Ural</th>
<th>West Siberia</th>
<th>East Siberia</th>
<th>Far East</th>
<th>Kaliningrad</th>
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<tr>
<td>North region</td>
<td>8231</td>
<td>10574</td>
<td>2898</td>
<td>3543</td>
<td>3409</td>
<td>2572</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>-140</td>
<td>-552</td>
<td>803</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>881</td>
<td>-336</td>
<td>-392</td>
<td>-771</td>
<td>-2245</td>
<td>-1471</td>
<td>-2109</td>
<td>-2289</td>
<td>-4397</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-881</td>
<td>-2437</td>
<td>-4131</td>
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<td>-12205</td>
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<td>-7980</td>
<td>-7943</td>
<td>-16692</td>
<td>-138</td>
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<td>336</td>
<td>2437</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>-154</td>
<td>-900</td>
<td>-273</td>
<td>-825</td>
<td>-1709</td>
<td>-2974</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Black Earth</td>
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<td>392</td>
<td>4131</td>
<td>-163</td>
<td>-511</td>
<td>-1934</td>
<td>-813</td>
<td>-1425</td>
<td>-2095</td>
<td>-5168</td>
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<tr>
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<td>771</td>
<td>6525</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>-2271</td>
<td>-2898</td>
<td>-3928</td>
<td>-3393</td>
<td>-6756</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>-2572</td>
<td>2254</td>
<td>12205</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>2271</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>-921</td>
<td>-3342</td>
<td>-8542</td>
<td>433</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ural</td>
<td>-1902</td>
<td>1471</td>
<td>4897</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>2898</td>
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<td>-1667</td>
<td>-3920</td>
<td>-6197</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Siberia</td>
<td>-599</td>
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<td>7980</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>1425</td>
<td>3928</td>
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<td>1667</td>
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<td>East Siberia</td>
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<td>7943</td>
<td>1709</td>
<td>2095</td>
<td>3393</td>
<td>3342</td>
<td>3920</td>
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<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>4397</td>
<td>16692</td>
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<td>7400</td>
<td>3625</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net</td>
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<td>21358</td>
<td>74403</td>
<td>6782</td>
<td>6782</td>
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<td>-4854</td>
<td>3176</td>
<td>-6567</td>
<td>-26738</td>
<td>-63278</td>
<td>4064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by author from Goskomstat (1999), p.39
When we focus on West Siberia, we can see that West Siberia has pushed some of its population out westward, but at the same time it has received immigrants from the eastern regions of East Siberia and the Far East. West Siberia has also consistently been a net population out-flow region to westward regions, so it is reasonable to assume that the population in West Siberia has decreased as much as those of East Siberia and the Far East region. They too have been strongly affected by natural population decreases and inter-regional westward emigration. However, contrary to our expectations, West Siberia has sometimes recorded population increases in the last decade, and the scale of depopulation in the 1990s is rather moderate compared with the other regions in the Russian Federation. While it is true that West Siberia has been depopulated by natural population decreases and westward out-flow migration, it has simultaneously received population inflows from the Central Asian region enough to soften the blow of depopulation.

We can understand why so many forced migrants at first came to West Siberia. It is because West Siberia is a border region, the first place they entered Russian territory; in addition, the city of Novosibirsk and some other cities in the southern part of West Siberia are the main traffic hubs in Siberia. However, there are questions to answer: Why and how did they resettle in West Siberia? Why didn’t they go further, for example to European Russia where economic opportunities seemed better than in Siberia, despite the fact that many of them did not recognize Russia or Siberia as their “motherland”? We have a suspicion that forced migrants are induced to stay in West Siberia by implicit federal or regional motivation to ease depopulation in Siberia. We believe this because forced migrants have been distributed so unevenly among regions.

Table 3  The share of Forced Migrants by Region in 1997 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Forced Migrants</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>Country before Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Caucasus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volga-Vyatka</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Black Earth</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ural</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Siberia</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Siberia</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaliningrad</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Compiled by author from Goskomstat (1998), pp.95-97, and pp.101-103
Note: Central Asia includes Kazakhstan.
West Siberia accepted 29,468 forced migrants and 28,972 forced resettlers in 1997. The number of registered forced migrants in West Siberia is the highest among the 11 economic regions in Russia. It accounts for 22.5% of all registered forced migrants in Russia. The registered forced migrants are centered in Novosibirsk Province and Altai territory. The share of registered forced migrants in these two areas comprises 53% in West Siberia. On the other hand, the Central region, where Moscow is located, had only 11.3% of all registered forced migrants in Russia. Moscow itself has only 9.2% of the forced migrants registered in the Central region (Table 3). The number of registered forced migrants per 10,000 citizens in 1997 was 27.3 persons in Novosibirsk Province, 30.5 persons in Altai territory, 1.6 persons in Moscow, and 3.0 persons in St. Petersburg (Goskomstat 1999, pp.103-105). Of course, freedom of residence is guaranteed for Russian citizens in the Russian constitution, and even in the law on forced migration, the freedom to choose one’s residence for resettlement is secured. Looking at these figures, though, it is doubtful that the Russian government encourages forced migrants to resettle in the region where they choose with their own will.

When we focus on forced migrants’ resettlement at the provincial level, the implicit inducement of forced migrants by authorities to move to rural areas and small cities in depopulated regions is much easier to observe. According to the Novosibirsk State Committee of Statistics, of all forced resettlers in Novosibirsk Province registered from 1992 to 2001, 36.2% were in Novosibirsk City, 11.9% were in small cities (Barabinsk, Berdsk, Iskitim, Kuibyshev, and Ob’ city), and the other 51.9% were situated in suburbs and rural areas (Novosibirskii 2002, p.44). The resettlement addresses of forced resettlers were not only Novosibirsk City, where more than half of population in Novosibirsk Province were concentrated, but also small local cities and rural areas. In fact, the Federal Migration Service made an effort to induce them to resettle in rural areas, but forced resettlers have not been willing to resettle there and often keep staying in Novosibirsk city and the other bigger cities in the province (Kalugina 1998, p.28). Even if forced resettlers had hoped to be registered in big cities, it was said that they rarely were (Vishnevskii 2001). Perevedentsev (2001, p. 33) suggested the Federal Migration Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs stubbornly and strictly compel migrants to resettle in rural areas, small cities, and new towns in suburbs. It is unclear how the Federal Migration Service can do so; however, it is no wonder that available information on resettlement apartments, which is served by the Federal Migration Service and is the first information forced migrants receive, consequently led them to rural areas and small cities.4

The inducement of forced resettlers into West Siberia, or rural areas and small cities, can be seen as a regional requirement. As we have already mentioned, West Siberia is in principle a population out-flow region, and small cities and rural areas in West Siberia, struggling with a labor shortage due to a natural population decrease and population out-flow, have tried to utilize resettlement of returned Russian migrants to maintain their populations and to promote regional

4 As written at Article 7 in the 1995 law, local Federal Migration Service provides a forced migrant with a full list of resettlements recommended for permanent residence, as well as information on living conditions and possibilities of finding a job there. Some benefit is ensured for rural resettlers (cit. from the translation by Helton & Voronina, p.220). Recommendations and benefits are suspected to induce forced migrants to rural areas.
economic development. How to utilize new resettlers and how to induce new settlers to the rural areas experiencing manpower shortages have often been discussed as some of the socio-economic priorities in the region in the discourse of Siberian researchers (for example: Zinchenko 2002, p. 141, Terekhov 2002, pp.138-39). They perceived forced migrant resettlement not as a threat to social stability, but as a contribution to ease depopulation and assist regional development.

The Russian federal government and regional governments, therefore, have an incentive to induce forced migrants to resettle in Siberia or rural areas and small cities in provincial level. It arises from the expectation that forced migrants would ease depopulation in the peripheries, and contribute something to regional economic development. In spite of that, the reality of resettlement for returned migrants in West Siberia has been far different from the expectation of efficient or rational utilization of the migrants for regional economic development.

4. The Conditions of Forced Migrants: Housing and Employment

The inducement of forced migrants into rural areas has never been convenient for them. Kalugina suggested the following:

Heads of families doubted the expediency of being directed to a village, and they often considered it just a short-time asylum and thought only of how to get out of it (Kalugina 1998, p. 31)

The forced resettlers who stayed with their relatives comprised just 18% of the total. This is understandable because the resettlement addresses were not really the places from which they left for Central Asia during the era of the former USSR. According to Kalugina (Kalugina 1998, p. 29), very few forced resettlers could buy a residence to resettle in, and many of them were staying in temporary apartments or hostels for new immigrants. Prevedentsev (2001, p. 34) described the situation as follows:

People quite often stray blindly, making the wrong choice for their places of resettlement and are then compelled to move (Prevedentsev 2001, p. 34).

The uncomfortable situation for forced resettlers was caused by housing and employment problems. Moreover, these problems are not only severe for forced migrants but also even for the local citizens.

Forced migrants have no choice but to depend on the Russian government and local government for housing, and the conditions required for obtaining proper housing from the local government are described as follows:

5 Prevedentsev stated that Russian forced migration policy aimed to distribute forced migrants to the local cities and rural areas where the population decreases were remarkable to maintain the local population and labor forces; for example, for the promotion of agricultural development in non-chernozem (black earth) areas (Perevedentsev, 2001, p.33).
government are the same for local citizens. For example, in Novosibirsk Province in the first half of the 1990s, enterprises released their managed housing to the local government in the course of privatization. The burden on the local government for supervising public housing became heavier, and the local government suffered as a result of managing them (USAID 1993). In 1997, about 44% of all housing in Novosibirsk was non-privatized housing (Novosibirskii 1998). While many existing public houses and apartments for citizens were in need of repair, the local government also had to provide new housing for forced migrants. Furthermore, like in many international cases, return migrants have not fared well in the labor market of their home country. Their unemployment rate is often higher than that of non-migrants or than their own unemployment rate before migration (UN 1998, p.157). Borodkin described the impact of forced migration on Russia as follows:

Essentially, the problem involves how giving high-grade help to one forced migrant from the local budget excludes giving minimum assistance to one desperately needy and poorly protected local resident. The fact is that forced migrants usually require a full complex of amenities, although the permanent resident has at least either a home or a job (Borodkin 1998, pp.19-20).

Resources from the Federal budget for providing temporary accommodation were mentioned in the 1995 law for forced migrants (Helton & Voronina 2000, pp.215-227). This was financed out of the housing fund of the Federal budget, as well as funds channeled from other sources. It is also possible for forced migrants to temporarily stay in their relatives’ or friends’ apartment houses. When forced migrants want to get their own permanent housing for resettlement, they need to be recorded on the waiting list for housing to be constructed or bought by the Federal or local budget. This means forced migrants are sooner or later provided with a temporary apartment; however, there is no certainty as to how long it takes for them to be provided with their permanent housing. Public care for housing for forced migrants incurs high costs for local governments.

As opposed to providing housing, the 1995 law only mildly mentioned a guarantee to provide forced migrants with employment. It was not responsibility of the Federal government but of local governments. It includes a reference for local governments to deal with forced migrants (Article 7). In general, return migration implies the creation of job vacancies in their former host country, and the generation of new unemployment in the home country under severe economic conditions. The regionally oriented distribution of forced migrants was expected to fill the local population “holes” resulting from the local citizens’ emigration, but there were no promises of employment in the southern part of West Siberia, where employment destruction was more serious than in the other regions (Horie 2002).

To explain the employment destruction in the southern part of West Siberia, we’d like to focus on the employment situation in Novosibirsk Province in the 1990s. In the course of Russia’s economic transition, it has been expected that labor mobility from state enterprises to private enterprises, and from traditional sectors to newly-generated sectors can be seen. This was moderately observed in Russia in the 1990s, but West Siberia did not follow the trend (Table 4).
Still almost half of all the employment in Novosibirsk Province remains in state enterprises. What is worse, private enterprises did not generate any significant employment from 1994 to 1999. In the Russian Federation, private enterprises generated employment during the same period, although it did not make up for the loss of employment state enterprises.

Table 4  Changes in number of the employed by ownership type: 1994-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership Type</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>+/-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation (million persons)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State enterprises</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private enterprises</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The others</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novosibirsk Province (thousand persons)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1153.6</td>
<td>906.2</td>
<td>-247.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State enterprises</td>
<td>621.5</td>
<td>479.6</td>
<td>-141.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private enterprises</td>
<td>363.1</td>
<td>284.2</td>
<td>-78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The others</td>
<td>169.0</td>
<td>142.4</td>
<td>-26.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: State enterprises include municipal enterprises.

Even the service sector, which was expected to be a newly-generated sector in the transitional period, has not generated enough employment to offset employment destruction in the traditional industrial sector in Novosibirsk Province in the 1990s. Let us divide all economic branches into three sectors. The A sector includes agriculture and forestry, the M sector includes industry, transportation, communication, and construction, while the S sector includes the other branches of all economy, which is roughly equivalent to the newly-generated sector in transition. The M sector in Novosibirsk Province drastically diminished, and the extent of employment generation in the S sector has been too moderate to offset employment destruction in the M sector, compared with Federal data. Employment generation is an urgent problem for Novosibirsk Province, but it is not happening, as Federal statistics show (Table 5).

Table 5  Changes in number of the employed by sector: 1994-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector Type</th>
<th>1994 (thousand persons)</th>
<th>1999 (thousand persons)</th>
<th>+/-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M sector</td>
<td>30718 (44.8%)</td>
<td>24296 (37.9%)</td>
<td>-6422 (-20.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A sector</td>
<td>10528 (15.4%)</td>
<td>8740 (13.7%)</td>
<td>-1788 (-17.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S sector</td>
<td>27238 (39.8%)</td>
<td>30927 (48.4%)</td>
<td>3689 (13.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68484 (100%)</td>
<td>63963 (100%)</td>
<td>-4521 (-6.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novosibirsk Province (thousand persons)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M sector</td>
<td>532.3 (46.2%)</td>
<td>325.5 (36.0%)</td>
<td>-206.8 (-38.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A sector</td>
<td>151.8 (13.1%)</td>
<td>109.9 (12.1%)</td>
<td>-41.9 (-27.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S sector</td>
<td>469.5 (40.7%)</td>
<td>470.8 (51.9%)</td>
<td>1.3 (0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1153.6 (100%)</td>
<td>906.2 (100%)</td>
<td>-247.4 (-21.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The forced resettlers distributed in Novosibirsk Province faced the same or a worse problem in the labor market. Among the forced resettlers coming to Novosibirsk Province in 1998, 70.2% were persons of working age who were able to work (Novosibirskii 1999, p.46), and most of the forced resettlers needed to find jobs. The first important contact for their housing and employment problem is with Federal Migration Service, but the Federal Migration Service cannot provide enough support for them to find employment. The main information source on vacancies in the labor market is generally the State Employment Service (SES). The SES, however, does not participate in the procedure for deciding the resettlement place, so all the SES can do is to wait for forced resettlers to visit the SES after they get their citizenship, meaning the SES cannot help forced resettlers to find jobs until they find themselves unemployed.

According to the research of Kalugina (1998, p.29), 64.1% of all forced migrants in Novosibirsk Province have obtained employment, and 10% have engaged in self-employment. Of these, 42% got their job through job vacancy columns in the mass media, 32.1% were helped in finding jobs by their relatives, and 25% found jobs through other methods. We counted the share of forced migrants who visited SES and who got jobs through SES with official data (Table 6). The share of unemployed citizens who used SES as a method to find their job increased from 28.1% to 39.9% in the 1990s. Based on these figures, it is obvious that forced migrants have depended little on the SES for finding their job.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Forced migrants</th>
<th>Forced migrants older than 16</th>
<th>Visiting SES</th>
<th>Employed through SES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6  Forced migrants and their use of the State Employment Service (SES) in Novosibirsk Province (%)
Source: Compiled by authors from Novosibirskii 1997, 2000b, 2002a, 2002b

Forced Migrants in Novosibirsk Province in 1997 Russian Census in 1994

| Higher education | 22.0 | 11.3 |
| Secondary professional education | 35.0 | 20.9 |
| Secondary general education | 43.0 | 61.3 |

Table 7  The level of education: Forced migrants in Novosibirsk Province and Russian citizens (%)
Source: Compiled by author from Novosibirskii (1999), Goskomstat (2001a)

It has been found that 35.7% of all employed forced migrants in Novosibirsk Province were satisfied with their employment, but more than the half of them were either partially or totally dissatisfied with their employment (Kalugina, p.29). This kind of dissatisfaction toward

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6 According to A.I. Semenov, who is a partaker in SES in Novosibirsk City, SES in principle has not given any special support to forced migrants, and they should depend on Federal Migration Service. This is because it takes a long, tough procedure to get citizenship. The interview was held 16th January 2003.
employment comes from the mismatch between their jobs and their level of education or qualification. It is said that many forced migrants were highly educated and qualified people (Perevedentsev 2001, p.33, Soboleva 2002, p.90). According to the data in 1997 in Novosibirsk Province, 57% of the forced migrants had secondary education, and 22% had higher education. From Russian census data collected in 1994, it was found that the share of highly educated people among forced migrants was larger than the share among Russian citizens (Table 7). Vitkovskaia (1995) suggested the share of white-color workers among forced migrants is about twice as large as the share among the employed in Russia. Their jobs before they immigrated to Russia were in culture, science, education, health care, and so on (Vitkovskaia 1995, Soboleva 2002).

As Vitkovskaia found, more than 40% of forced migrants did not obtain employment in their specialized fields, and furthermore the share of forced migrants in rural areas was 3.5 times larger than in urban areas. Their professional status also diminished more than two ranks below their previous positions (Vitkovskaia 1995, p.11). Forced migrants were often once in urban jobs and occupied rather higher positions in the countries they had left, because the former Soviet cadre policy, especially in Kazakhstan, allowed highly skilled Russian professionals to make up a very large proportion of the engineers, technocrats and other white-color workers (Kaostoe, pp. 93-95). As the result, many forced migrants with higher-level education suffered difficulties adapting to rural circumstances in employment and in living.

Overall, unemployed Russian citizens tend to depend on their personal connections to find their own job. About 60% of overall unemployed citizens who found jobs used their personal connections to find their job (Goskomstat 2001b, p.195). In turn, Novosibirsk Province was in many cases not the “home” for forced resettlers as we have already mentioned, so that they often did not have any personal connections to draw on for support. Without any institutional framework to guide them to an appropriate job, they don’t have many opportunities for finding a job.

The rational inducement of forced migrants to West Siberia or other rural areas and small cities so as to alleviate regional depopulation must be beneficial for local economic development. However, our survey showed that there was much dissatisfaction with the inducement. This means the present induced geographical distribution of forced migrants has not been so rational or efficient from their point of view. The procedure for choosing their area of residence must include a facility for orienting them toward appropriate employment. If this does not occur, the induced geographical distribution of forced migrants will fail to meet regional expectations.

5. Conclusion

Many ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan and forced migrants in West Siberia have few options for determining or improving their living conditions, employment, and their future. Ethnic tension between ethnic Russians and the titular group in Kazakhstan has made many ethnic Russians to

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choose de facto the only option, that is, emigration to Russia from Kazakhstan where they predominantly feel “rooted.” Additionally, the forced migrants in Siberia also have few options to choose from. The freedom to choose their residence is secured by law, but they have been distributed into rural areas and small cities where the authorities are managing to ease de-population. The limits of the federal and regional budgets caused them a lot of trouble in relation to housing and employment. This means the forced migrants cannot improve their status and prospects for the future in either West Siberia or in their former host countries. What is worse is that almost all the issues the regional authority should care for the forced migrants are the same issues as those facing non-migrants in the same region.

In Kazakhstan, the “holes” left by ethnic Russians who emigrated to the Russian Federation have been filled by ethnic Kazakhs who have returned from Mongolia, Uzbekistan, and other countries. Financial incentives have also been offered to Kazakhs to move from densely populated Kazakh areas to resettle in these “holes” (Bremmer, 1994, p.621). The out-migration of ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan exceeded one million by the early 1999, and the number of the ethnic Kazakh return migrants was estimated as half a million by 1997 (Polat, 2002, p.79). At the same time in Russia, the “holes” where local people emigrated westward to other provinces have been filled by Russian forced migrants from Kazakhstan and the other former Soviet republics to maintain the population in rural areas and small cities in West Siberia. It is ironic that the political instruments that utilize return migrants to fill the ethnic and population “holes” in the regions both in Kazakhstan and in the Russian Federation are driven by taking advantage of ethnic Russian migration.

The problem of forced migrants in West Siberia has become an important issue under the umbrella of regional de-industrialization and employment loss. It is clear that housing without appropriate jobs would render financial support for the forced migrants futile. As long as they cannot get appropriate jobs and their mandated resettlement area is not their “historical home,” the forced migrants will become inter-regional migrants. Therefore, the most important issues to be faced in the resettlement of forced migrants are to offer them appropriate chances to find their own jobs, make them participate in the regional economy, and support them by regarding their offered resettlement location as their “home.” Such an approach requires the fulfillment of two tasks.

The first task is to generate employment in West Siberia. West Siberia has to generate jobs for forced migrants under the same conditions in which non-migrants in Siberia also face a general lack of employment opportunities. This means that the problem of resettlement cannot be solved without generating overall employment growth in the region. Weak employment generation in the offered resettlement areas, not only for return migrants but also for non-migrants, will make it harder for the government to keep them staying there. The intensity of the population outflow and the difficulty of resettling forced migrants are both consequences of the regional employment problem. Therefore, a strategy of regional economic development as an instrument for creating employment is crucial for stabilizing resettlement.

The second task is to solve the problem of mismatches between forced migrants’ potential and available regional jobs. This implies that an effective public employment service should play an
important role in the decisions on resettlement areas. The jobs in offered resettlement areas often mismatch the skills and level of education acquired by the forced migrants. This discourages the migrants from staying in the offered region and exaggerates the population out-flow there. Forced migrants have much difficulty in finding jobs after resettlement, and although the employment problem is no less severe for non-migrants than for resettled forced migrants, the migrants require more government protection than the non-migrants. It is not fair to expect forced migrants to follow the same rules for finding jobs as non-migrants, because they don’t have—or have lost—sufficient social ties in the region. Public support in providing appropriate jobs for them is a crucial pre-condition for directing the movement of forced migrants to certain regions.

The distribution of forced migrants to specific regions should coincide with the provision of jobs that are appropriate for them. Therefore, a special employment policy for forced migrants should be seriously considered. Otherwise, the offered resettlement housing would be just a “way station” to westward regions. The potential of forced migrants as human resources is of course available for regional economic development, but they cannot contribute to it without preferential treatment for housing and employment. The priority of their resettlement is not to distribute them into rural areas and small cities to fill the population “holes” in West Siberia, but to create the circumstances where they can participate in economic activities in the region and can feel the resettlement place as their “home”.

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