CONCEPT OF SOCIETAL SECURITY

AND

MIGRATION ISSUES IN CENTRAL ASIA AND RUSSIA

SEONGJIN KIM

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“Central Asian Migration and International Cooperation (Cammic)” is one of the projects in the Program for Area Studies based on Needs of Society by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (Japan). This is the international collaborative research project, examining the growing cross-border migration between Central Asian countries and the neighboring countries and its impact on human and national security. The Cammic Working Papers are published in order to share visions and perspectives on migration issues in Central Asia, although the views expressed in the working papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the organizations related to the Cammic.

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Concept of Societal Security and Migration Issues in Central Asia and Russia

I. Introduction

This study explores the implications of migration on regional stability in Russia and Central Asia by employing a societal security concept. During the last decade, cooperative efforts have been made between Russia and Central Asian countries to control national borders and migration. From a national security point of view, the question of migration has produced cooperation rather than conflict among the Russian and Central Asian countries. By contrast, human security discourse has focus on such growing security threats as the harsh living conditions of migrants, corruption, human trafficking, organized crime, ‘extended families,’ and xenophobia not only in the receiving but also in the sending countries. In general, cooperation seems to be growing at the inter-state level, while instability is increasing at the society or sub-state levels. What are the implications of such contradictory development?

Since migration is a very traditional topic, studies have been conducted from economic and security perspectives. For economic perspectives, strong emphasis is laid upon relations between labor mobility and economic efficiency, combined with the analysis of factors that explain migration flows, e.g., the ‘push-pull effect’. Another long historical debate has tackled the effect of international migration on economic performance. Liberalists, neo-liberalists, and some economic historians argue that maximum economic efficiency can be achieved within a framework that guarantees the free flow of capital and labor (Gosh 2000; O’Rourke and Williams 1999; Hatton and Williamson 1998). At the same time, however, such negative points of international migration as brain drain from the sending countries are also evident (Laruelle 2007; Chiswick 2000).

Until recently, migration has often been regarded as part of domestic policy, and to which relatively little attention has been paid in the discourse of international relations theories. However migration affects the security of states and may provoke internal and international threats (Rudolph 2003). Efforts to capture the security aspects of migration are evident when the security concept is expanded to human and societal security (McDonald 2002; King & Murry 2001/02; Edward 2001; Buzan et al. 1998; Krause & Williams 1996; Buzan 1991a; Buzan 1991b; Walt 1991; Ullman 1983).

A brief literature review, however, suggests that little attention has been focused on the conflicts between actors involved in migration issues other than inter-state conflicts as a source of instability. Cooperation at state or international levels certainly relieves

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1 For instance, neoclassical economists argue that migration flows are mainly decided by the personal calculation of the cost-revenue of migration and thus, are controlled by market principles without interference from states (Boras 1989). Their views are challenged when labor mobility is positively interrelated to individual’s economic, social and intellectual capitals, suggesting that access to an international labor market is limited (Sklair 2001). Others emphasize the family or small society level of the decision-making of migration instead of the individual level. In fact, according to the discourse of New Economics, market failures, relative deprivation and relative income levels of families tend to cause international migration (Stark 1991; Stark and Bloom 1985).
migration-related problems. However, it may become insufficient when we retreat from a realist belief that a state is a single and integrated actor in international relations. For instance, state and sub-state actors may have conflicting interests that might cause domestic instability and become an obstacle to international cooperation.

Second, many argue that the ‘proper’ management of migration enables the minimization of instability that is potentially caused by migration and the maximization of economic gains. In this context, uncontrolled migration, not the migration itself, is regarded as a major source of instability. Accordingly, efforts tend to concentrate on gathering exact statistics of uncontrolled migration, a difficult process even in ‘advanced’ countries. However, scant attention has been paid to the perception of migrants and migration-related issues. Negative perceptions, which are often regarded as exaggerations and misunderstandings, are thus believed to fade away once correct information is provided. Yet perception in itself is reality, exaggerated it might be, as noted in the discourse of constructivism. In particular, when perception has been built as a collective memory of a particular group or society—i.e., the ‘yellow perils’ in the Russian Far East—‘correct’ statistics may have only limited impact on perception. What are the implications of such perceptions in the development of migration issues?

In this study, the societal security concept is employed to analyze the source of instability at the sub-state level and its implications on regional stability with the case of migration issues in Russia and Central Asia, where the world’s second largest migration took place since the early 1990s. This study begins with a brief discussion of the societal security concept, followed by a general overview of migration trends in Russia and Central Asia. The following section examines the policies and attitudes of states and sub-state actors and analyses disputes between the two. The implications of the policy/perception gaps between state and sub-state actors are explored at the tail end of this paper.

II. Societal Security and Migration Issues

Globalization and the end of cold war have changed the general feature of security threats. The dangers of military confrontation between major powers have decreased while direct threats toward the general public have increased. Since the 1980s various efforts have been made to conceptualize these changes in such terms as security complex theory, comprehensive security, human security, and so on (McDonald 2002; King & Murry 2001/02; Newman 2001; Krause & Williams 1996; UNDP 1994; Booth 1991a).

Much discussion has featured the ‘third grand debate’ of international relation theories.² For security, the debate is expanding the discussion in three dimensions: the referent point of security, the ranges of threats, and measures to secure stability. For the referent point of security, states lie in the middle of traditional security theories, while on the other end, individuals do in the human security discourse.³ Threats to the state come from three dimensions: ideas of the state (nationalism), its physical bases (population and resources), and its institutional expression (political system) (Buzan 1991a, p. 65). By

² For a brief review of ‘grand debates,’ see Terriff 2001, Chapter 1.
³ Those who look at third world countries argue that the ruling regime, not the state, might be the key referent point of security, as implied by ‘regime security’ (Ball 1988).
contrast, others argue that the referent point of security should be expanded to the security of individuals, including starvation, disease, bankruptcy, unemployment, not to mention natural disasters, ethnic conflicts, and wars (Booth 1991b; Strange 1988).

The nature of security threats has also been expanded in the course of ‘grand debates’ of international theories, although no agreement has been found. Referent points suggest that traditional security focuses on threats to the components of a state, mainly sovereignty, which is started by war, i.e., military conflicts between states (Terriff et al. 2001, p. 20). Accordingly, war studies constitute a prime area of the traditional sense of security studies. However, the range is expanded to include economic inequality, as in Gilpin’s discussion (Gilpin 1992), then to political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors combined with military sectors, as in Buzan (Buzan et al. 1998; Waever et al. 1993; Buzan 1991a; Buzan 1991b). In the traditional and new wave of security studies security is to be achieved in different ways; the former underlines the competing characteristics of inter-state relations and stability, while the latter emphasizes cooperation among security actors including states.

The expansion of security concepts triggered vehement discussion of the boundaries of security studies. Traditional security advocates argued that the expansion of security concepts resulted in conceptual confusion and obstructed security efforts, contradicting the original intension of expansion (Mearsheimer 1995; Romm 1993; Morgan 1992; Walt 1991; Nye & Lynn-Jones 1988). This discussion, which failed to reach an agreement, only recognized the task of refining the boundary of security studies that includes ‘new’ challenges, while not ‘every problem.’

Societal security discourses emerged to bridge the gap between the changing features of threats and consistency in security studies:

The issue of societal security is a novelty in the field of security studies, and on some essential points it goes against the essential procedures and premises of the field. But we do not offer societal security as the new, alternative theory to replace all the classical security and strategic studies. Our objective is to make sure that the new agenda is carefully inserted into existing security theory. We want to be precise as possible as to what consequential revisions have to be made in security theory, and that actually stay the same (Waever et al. 1993, p. 27).

What are society and threats to society? Waever and Buzan, the foremost proponents of societal security, maintain that societal security concerns situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms:

On this basis, we can conclude that in the contemporary international system, societal security concerns the ability of a society to

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4 War studies also include the economic factors of war (Barbieri & Schneider 1999; Oneal & Russett 1997; Barbieri 1996; Growa & Mansfield 1993).

5 For instance, Walt maintained that security studies should be limited to the threats, use, and control of military power (Walt 1991, p. 212).

6 In this context Dorff warned that the concept of security would signify nothing if every domestic, regional, and international policy of a state were included in security studies (Dorff 1994, pp. 26-27).
persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. More specially, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom. This definition makes it difficult to give any object definition of when there is a threat to societal security (Waever et al. 1993, p. 25).

As a collective phenomenon societal security is “not the sum of the security of smaller social groups” (Waever et al. 1993, p. 20), “not the security of individual parts, nor is it the sum of the security of parts” (Waever et al. 1993, p. 26). Societal security is not social security (Waever et al. 1993, p. 27). What is ‘society’ in this context? Society is defined by Giddens: ‘a clustering of institutions combined with a feeling of common identity’ (1985, 164, in Waever 1993, 21). Societies, according to Waever’s notion, differ from other social groups “in having a high degree of social inertia, values and ‘institutions’ in the wider sense (Waever et al. 1993, 21).

The societal security concept suggests that it sides with state security as part of state security when a society is established within the border of a state, although it can be independently recognised and thus be at odds with state security. At the same time, as the development of the European community suggests, societal security discourse goes beyond the boundary of a state, suggesting that the societal security concept is a distinctive referent object” (Waever et al. 1993, 27).

Where do threats to societal security originate? Threats to identity, a main referent object of societal security, range “from the suppression of its expression to interference with its ability to reproduce” to competing identities and migration that could be the main threats in societal sectors where societal security clearly differs from state security (Waever et al. 1993, p. 43). Threats to societal security are obvious when the identities of a society are mutually exclusive. Migration, in this context, constitutes a threat to a society when ‘alien’ identities pose a threat or are perceived as threatening to the existing society’s identity.

However, as suggested in the concept of societal security itself, this idea is apt to be perceived as subjective rather than objective, although a sort of agreement could be found on the level of migration at which it is regarded as desirable and sustainable. In particular, as in traditional security dilemma, a societal security dilemma is found when “perceptions of ‘the others’ develop into mutually reinforcing an ‘enemy-picture’ leading to the same kind of negative dialectics.” Furthermore, such societal security dilemmas may operate separately from inter-state relations, suggesting their own dynamics of development:

Societal security dilemmas might explain why some processes of social conflict seem to acquire a dynamic of their own. While initial conflict might be explained with diverging interests, from a certain threshold the processes can evolve with a self-sustained internal

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7 Also see McSweeney 1996.
8 Buzan et al. maintained that the following are the three most common societal threats: migration that causes changes in ethnic composition, such horizontal competition as the influence of neighboring cultures, and vertical competition that often takes secessionist or regionalist projects (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 121.
9 For a further discussion of the theoretical aspect of societal security dilemmas, see Alexseev 2006, Chapters 1-3.
dynamic, which might end up being very destructive. Sometimes inter-state and inter-societal security dilemmas might coincide, as between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but societal security dilemmas can also operate largely detached from state relations, as in the civil wars in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Georgia, Sri Lanka and elsewhere (Waever et al. 1993, p. 46).

What can a society respond to perceived threats? In general, a society can rely on two measures, state-oriented and nonstate ones. Border control and legislation are typical state-oriented measures that make the “societal sector difficult to analyse because they often merge gradually with the political sector” (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 122). As nonstate measures, three options are observed: to dominate the government, to form own government, or to be ‘alone’ (as Chinese abroad) (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 122).

A brief review of societal security discourse suggests a couple of implications to the analysis of migration issues in particular. First, threats to the identity of a society constitute societal security threats. Due to the constructivist aspect of the identity-building process, subjective perception comprises the prime importance in identifying societal security threats. Second, the ‘duality’ of security should be recognized; societal security, which has its own dynamics of development, is not only independent from state security but sometimes contradictory to it. Finally, reducing contradictions between state and societal securities constitutes a key element of a successful security policy (Waever et al. 1993, p. 57).

III. Migration Trends in Russia and Central Asia

If reducing contradictions between state and societal security is a precondition for successful security policies, state security depends not only on the success of such security policies but also on the coordination of policies/perceptions among the state and societies concerned. Furthermore, at least in theory, the existing equilibrium of state and societal securities is apt to fluctuate depending on the changes in migration patterns, assuming that such factors as the policies of other states and societies are constant. In this context, we need to examine three factors—the changes of migration trends, and state and societal securities—to analyze the security aspect of migration issues.

During the last century, international migration patterns have swung from free flows to strict control. Rystad, for instance, recognised four stages of migration development in Western Europe since 1860: open gate between 1860 and 1914, characterized by extensive migration; shut gate between 1914 and 1945 due to unemployment and racism; a returned to open gate between 1945-1974, partly resulting from the high demand for labor forces; and another shut gate between 1974 and 1980 when migration was limited exclusively to family reunions and political refugees (Rystad 1992, pp. 1169-1172). Rystad added that increasing refugee migration from Asia in the 1980s may be a fifth phase (Rystad 1992, p. 1172).

In the 1990s, however, increasing migration occurred with a mixture of labor

migration, refugees, and ‘statistical migrants.’ Legal and illegal labor flows increased due to the collapse of economies in the process of reform and the growing level of unemployment and economic disparities (e.g., between the CIS and adjacent countries). Ever-increasing refugees have also been created by the outbreak of international and civil wars, political transitions both authoritarian and democratic, and international political tensions (Rystad 1992, pp. 1192-1193). In particular, the collapse of the former Soviet Union that created ‘new’ countries produced large numbers of ‘statistical migrants’ who “may not have physically moved, but were defined as migrants under the UN practice” (Mansoor & Quillin 2007, p. 24). Environmental dangers fostered migration in the CIS countries: about 300 regions were included in that category (Rystad 1992, p. 1195).

As a result, Russia and Central Asia became one of the main axes of migration. Only surpassed by the United States, Russia had 13 million migrants or more than one-third of the total number of foreign-born population in Europe and Central Asia. As in Figure 1, Russia is also the largest sending country. Among Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan has also become one of the top ten receiving and sending countries, and Uzbekistan is one of the top ten sending countries. Russia also houses the largest share of migrants from CIS countries (Mansoor & Quillin 2007, pp. 23-24).

Fig. 1 Migration in top ten receiving & sending countries (stock of migration, 2003)

![Graph showing migration in top ten countries](image)


Most of Russia’s migrants are from CIS countries, reaching 95% in 1997, and the proportion has remained over 90% through the 2000s, though it is slightly decreasing (see Table 1). By contrast, a relatively smaller proportion of migrants chose CIS countries as their destination, and the proportion decreased until 2004. During the same period, a relatively large proportion of out-migrants traveled to Western Europe including Germany, the US, Canada, and Israel. Relatively large out-migration to Germany was also found in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, but from different backgrounds. The migration flow from Kazakhstan to Germany is ethnic, i.e., mainly returning Germans deported during the Soviet period; those from Ukraine to Germany are motivated by geo-economic reasons, i.e., geographical vicinity and income differences (Mansoor & Quillin 2007, p. 36).

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11 Among 13 million migrants counted in 2000, about 1.3 to 1.5 million (11% of the migrant totals) were estimated to be irregular migrants in Russia (Mansoor & Quillin 2007, p. 45).
Table 1. Russia-CIS migration (1997-2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arrivals (people) from CIS</th>
<th>Departures (people) to CIS</th>
<th>Total from CIS (%)</th>
<th>Total to CIS</th>
<th>To CIS (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>597651</td>
<td>571903</td>
<td>95.7</td>
<td>232987</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>513551</td>
<td>488087</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>213377</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>379726</td>
<td>362708</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>214963</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>359330</td>
<td>346774</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>145720</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>193450</td>
<td>183650</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>121166</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>184612</td>
<td>175068</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>106685</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>129144</td>
<td>119661</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>94018</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>119157</td>
<td>110374</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>79795</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>177230</td>
<td>168598</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>69798</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2. Population changes and net migration in Russia (1990-2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population (1,000)</th>
<th>Natural increase</th>
<th>Net migration (b)</th>
<th>Increase (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>147665</td>
<td>333.6</td>
<td>275.0</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>148274</td>
<td>104.9</td>
<td>136.1</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>148515</td>
<td>-219.2</td>
<td>266.2</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>148562</td>
<td>-732.1</td>
<td>526.3</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>148356</td>
<td>-874.0</td>
<td>978.0</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>148460</td>
<td>-822.0</td>
<td>653.7</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>148292</td>
<td>-776.5</td>
<td>513.5</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>148029</td>
<td>-740.6</td>
<td>514.1</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>147802</td>
<td>-691.5</td>
<td>428.8</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>147539</td>
<td>-918.8</td>
<td>295.9</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>146890</td>
<td>-949.1</td>
<td>362.6</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>146304</td>
<td>-932.8</td>
<td>278.5</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>145649</td>
<td>-916.5</td>
<td>230.8</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>144964</td>
<td>-888.5</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>144168</td>
<td>-792.9</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>143474</td>
<td>-846.6</td>
<td>125.9</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Two major bilateral migration flows involving Germany suggest that different patterns of ethnic and economic migrations have developed. As far as Russian Germans and Jews are concerned, ethnic migration appears to be decreasing, particularly this decade, partly because about 200,000 ethnic Germans had already returned to Germany in 1990-1991 and over half a million Jews to Israel (Shevtsova 1992, p. 247). The number of German departures from Russia was annually about 20,000 or less during 2002-2004 and fell to less than 10,000 in 2005 (Goskomstat 2006). Considering the increasing
numbers of seasonal workers and labor migration, quotas reached six million in 2007; the dominance of economic migration will continue in the future.\textsuperscript{12}

In relation to future migration trends, population changes are also noteworthy. In fact, since the early 2000s the populations of most Central Asian countries have been increasing, except Russia and Kazakhstan. Despite net migration gains, in Russia since 1992 the population has been decreasing. By contrast, the population is growing in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan where out-migration dominates. In Kazakhstan, population decrease was caused by negative net migration in the early 2000s (see Figure 1.3 in Mansoor & Quillin 2007, p. 31.), but increased in 2005 and 2006.\textsuperscript{13} In fact, Russia recognised ‘replacement migration’ as a measure for dealing with declining population, and the country will surely require a large number of emigrants.\textsuperscript{14}

The trend suggests that Russia may retain its status as a receiving country in the future, particularly for its increasing demand for labor forces, higher income levels and living standards,\textsuperscript{15} a long national border that remains relatively porous, and a historical legacy that encourages Central Asians to choose Russia as their destination. Kazakhstan is also emerging as a receiving country in Central Asia, perhaps for similar reasons as Russia.

\textbf{IV. Dilemmas in Russia’s Migration Policy}

Migration, according to Rudolph, “rests at the nexus of three dimensions of security, including geopolitical interests, material production, and internal security;” it is an “integral part of a grand strategy” (Rudolph 2003, p. 603). Russian migration policy also reflects the changing interactions of international and domestic security actors, her strategic surroundings, and her capabilities. We can discuss two factors of the issue—the emigration of ethnic Russians and legal/illegal foreign migration—by roughly dividing the period into two stages: ethnic migration (1990/91-1996) and economic migration periods (1997- ). During this period, the Russian government prioritized geopolitical goals, and the sub-state actors tried to convert societal threats into political ones and thus onto state agendas.

First, in the beginning stage of migration in the former Soviet Union after its collapse, ethnic Russians in CIS countries attracted the attention of the Russian government from a security point of view, i.e., the protection of Russians. When such ‘statistical migration’ became forced migration and ethnic Russians fled back to Russia, Russia recognized it as a security challenge and took a dual-track approach; she launched a settling programme for Russians from abroad and pressured CIS countries to protect their human rights on the basis of international standards.

\textsuperscript{12} According to Mansoor and Quillin, ethnic migration, which prevailed in the early 1990s, will give way to economic migration in the future (Mansoor & Quillin 2007, p. 26).

\textsuperscript{13} Populations are growing in Uzbekistan (24.7 to 26.5 million), Turkmenistan (4.5 to 4.9 million), Tajikistan (6.2 to 6.7 million), and Kazakhstan (14.9 to 15.3 million) between 2000 and 2006 (see World Bank Country Profile).

\textsuperscript{14} According to Mansoor & Quillin, Russia may require a positive net migration of 24.9 million between 2000 and 2050 to maintain her population as of 1995. Maintaining the same-sized workforce as 1995 requires at net migration of 35.8 million, which is more than ten times larger than the net migration made in the 1990s (Mansoor & Quillin 2007, p. 55).

\textsuperscript{15} Apart from demanding labor forces, economic disparities are growing among Russia and Central Asian countries. In 2006 the GNI per capita was US$ 390 in Tajikistan, US$ 490 in Kyrgyzstan, and US$ 610 in Uzbekistan, while it reached US$ 3,790 in Kazakhstan, and US$ 5,780 in Russia (see World Bank Country Profile data on its website).
However, this dual-track approach produced unintended results. On one hand, the government’s resettlement programme of March 1993 and supporting programmes adopted in August 1994 and August 1996 suffered from lack of financial supports. As seen in Figure 2, emigration peaked in 1994 and greatly exceeded the support of the Russian government. Consequently, resettlement posed an extra financial burden on the backs of local/regional governments and frustrated emigrants. This led to another failure during the second stage of the migration policy. From the perspective of the migrants, the resettlement programme was too tight without financial merits, but for regional governments, it merely drained already limited resources at their hands.

On the other hand, Russia’s entreaty to the CIS countries was considered interventionist and only fueled skepticism about her intentions in the CIS. Although Russia needed to control mass migration (either legal or illegal) during this period, such a drive fanned anti-Russian sentiment and, combined with insufficient experience controlling mass international migration, Russia failed to formulate an international framework to control migration during the early ethnic migration period in the post-Soviet space.

Second, ‘ethnic migration’ became more ‘economic’ in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which is about the second stage of migration. For the central government, however, ‘statistical migration’ (either ethnic or economic) could become ‘replacement migration’ that would relieve natural population loss, another source of national security threats. In the second stage of migration, the central government had another motive to accommodate the Russian-speaking population from near abroad (see Figure 2), but it was from a national security aspect.
### Table 3. Population changes in Russia between 1989 and 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Population (1,000)</th>
<th>Changes (%)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Urban areas</th>
<th>Rural areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>147022</td>
<td>-1855</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>37920</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Western</td>
<td>15237</td>
<td>-1262</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
<td>-9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>20536</td>
<td>2371</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>31785</td>
<td>-630</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Urals</td>
<td>12526</td>
<td>-152</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siberia</td>
<td>21068</td>
<td>-1005</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakha</td>
<td>1094</td>
<td>-145</td>
<td>-13.3</td>
<td>-16.8</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primorskiy</td>
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<td>-185</td>
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<td>-7.1</td>
<td>-12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khabarovsk</td>
<td>1598</td>
<td>-162</td>
<td>-10.1</td>
<td>-9.8</td>
<td>-12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amur</td>
<td>1550</td>
<td>-147</td>
<td>-14.0</td>
<td>-16.7</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamchatka</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>-113</td>
<td>-23.9</td>
<td>-24.2</td>
<td>-22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koriak</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>-37.5</td>
<td>-53.3</td>
<td>-28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magadan</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>-209</td>
<td>-53.3</td>
<td>-48.5</td>
<td>-78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakhalin</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>-163</td>
<td>-23.0</td>
<td>-18.8</td>
<td>-42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>-23</td>
<td>-10.7</td>
<td>-9.2</td>
<td>-13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chukotka</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>-110</td>
<td>-67.1</td>
<td>-69.7</td>
<td>-60.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Goskomstat 2001, pp. 82-93; Goskomstat 2004, pp. 77-78.

However, at this stage, regional disparities were found in Russia in terms of population decline and labor shortages, although population decline was severe in the federation as a whole. Both problems are particularly acute in the Russian Far East and North-Western Federal Okrugs (see Table 3). By contrast population increased in the Central Federal Okrug, perhaps due to international and domestic migration.

The case of the Russian Far East shows the dilemma of traditional security and societal priorities since the history-long fear of Chinese migration is strong in the Russian Far East. For the central government, top priority is given to strengthening its strategic partnership with China, while Chinese demands for access to local labor markets and relaxed control of Chinese migrants are perceived as ‘Chinese invasion’ by the locals in the Russian Far East (Soboleva 2006/07; Kim 1994; Siegelbaum 1978). In this context, a solution is ‘replacement immigration’ of the Russian-speaking population, not of the Chinese.

However, the results of ‘replacement migration’ appear limited. As shown in Table 4, it only proceeded in stable patterns in the Central Federal Okrug and had little impact in Siberia and the Russian Far East, where 70-80% of the migrants failed to settle and found other domestic destinations or went abroad. The trend is particularly evident in such poor regions as the small republics in the south and the agricultural regions in Siberia, while Moscow oblast only lost 9% of its migrants. Those poor regions were losing population even with international emigrants: migrations are concentrated in better-off regions, a typical result of economic migration (Goskomstat 2006, pp. 472-482). This means that the original intension to provide manpower where it was demanded, had
failed. The concentration of migrants in a limited area, mostly in the regions of Central Federal Okrug, e.g., Moscow, created additional security threats (see Table 4).

Table 4 Arrivals and departures in Russian Federal Okrugs (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Arrivals (A)</th>
<th>Departures (D)</th>
<th>A-D</th>
<th>D/A (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RF total</td>
<td>177230</td>
<td>69798</td>
<td>107432</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>60,111</td>
<td>11842</td>
<td>48269</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgorod Oblast</td>
<td>5350</td>
<td>1067</td>
<td>4283</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaluga Oblast</td>
<td>3792</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>3364</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow Oblast</td>
<td>14006</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>12746</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riazan Oblast</td>
<td>2174</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tver Oblast</td>
<td>2745</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>2502</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulsk Oblast</td>
<td>3259</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>2700</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Western</td>
<td>16045</td>
<td>7408</td>
<td>8637</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leningrad Oblast</td>
<td>4101</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>3372</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>20846</td>
<td>10329</td>
<td>10517</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Ossetia rep</td>
<td>1762</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>1494</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>30556</td>
<td>9963</td>
<td>20593</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perm Oblast</td>
<td>1821</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>1517</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samara Oblast</td>
<td>6143</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>5144</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Urals</td>
<td>18582</td>
<td>7959</td>
<td>10623</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siberia</td>
<td>27345</td>
<td>19211</td>
<td>8134</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>3765</td>
<td>3086</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Including regions with less than 20% of migration loss (D/A)

Source: Goskomstat 2006, pp. 472-482.

Fig. 3 Migrations by ethnic group in Russia (1997, 2000-05)

Source: Goskomstat 2006, pp. 508-509.
Such unintended results again spread mistrust among concerned political actors. In 2006, the Russian government drafted another programme to support the resettlement of ethnic Russians in near abroad, hoping to bring 50,000 ethnic Russians home in 2007 and 100,000 in 2008. In fact, among documented emigrants, ethnic Russians particularly dominated during the ethnic migration period in the early 1990s. Among emigrants, ethnic Russians accounted for about from 350,000 or 58.4% in 1997 and up to 60,000 or 51.2% in 2003 (see Figure 3). In general the proportion of ethnic Russian accounted for about 50 to 56% from 2000 and 2005, although the actual numbers of ethnic Russians are declining in line with the general decline of emigration as a whole.

Although Russian ethnic migrants are decreasing, her growing economic capability may simplify attracting Russian economic migrants in the 2000s than it was in the 1990s. However, the resettlement scheme of 2006 accommodated only 400 people among 35,000 enquiries in 2007. Vadim Gustav, head of the Federal Council CIS Affairs Committee, blamed the failure on unclear legal measures and the lack of support from regional governments including Moscow and St. Petersburg.16 The incident reveals the tensions between the central and regional governments concerning migration control.

Third, as for cooperation with adjacent countries, Russia changed its attitude toward the CIS, placing higher emphasis on building a mechanism for border control and the coordination of security matters. For the central government, the strategic environment sharply changed in the CIS, particularly in Central Asia, during the 1990s. Russia was facing NATO expansion, US military projection and political presence (as in ‘colour revolutions’) in the CIS, particularly after the 9.11 terrorist attacks, the Afghan war, and increasing Islam extremist terrorist attacks (Tsygankov 2005; Jakson 2003; Donaldson & Nogee 2002; Baev 1997). In the process, Russia’s top security priorities in the CIS were to win a ‘grand game’ with the US (Blank 2005; Brzezinski 1997) and the war against terrorism. In doing so Russia chose to establish cooperation mechanisms “at a different speed and different level of integration with the CIS framework” (see the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, Chapter IV). For instance, under the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Association (SCO), Russia, other Central Asian countries, and China established the Anti-terror Centre in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan and the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RSTS) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan (Maksutov 2006).17 In the framework, Russia also developed bilateral cooperation to support the efforts of other Central Asian countries to control their borders. For instance, Russia and Kyrgyzstan agreed to modernise Kyrgyzstan border guards in June 2000.18 Such efforts were closely in line with the border agreements among the SCO member states (including Russia-China, Russia-Kazakhstan-China, Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-China, and Kyrgyzstan-China borders).19

Another success of the Russian policy in the CIS can be found in the development of such regional organizations as the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO)20 and the CIS Collective Security Treaty (CST), which was established in 1994 and then

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16 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 11, no. 230 (December 13, 2007). Fourteen federal subjects reportedly rejected the idea.
17 For discussion of SCO developments, see Gleason 2001.
20 It was established in 1991 with the participation of four Central Asian countries. In 1998, Turkmenistan worked out, while Tajikistan joined. Russia also joined the Organization in 2004. It merged into the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) in 2005 when Uzbekistan joined the EEC.
expanded to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2002. In particular, it was a victory for Russia when Uzbekistan decided to withdraw from the GUAM, which was established in 1997 to balance Russian influence in the region, and joined CSTO.21

Considering such new challenges as the US presence in the region and religious extremist activities that are closely linked with Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Uyghurs in China, who might be supporting the Chechens in war, Russia’s prime security concerns remain traditional security sectors to which migration issues are subordinated. Such a priority may produce tension between the central government and other political actors such as regional governments and NGOs, though their powers and influence appeared severely decreased under Putin.

Fourth, undocumented or illegal migration has also emerged as a critical issue in Russia. In the initial stages, it was nearly impossible to control since even the borders were not fixed then. Furthermore, the former Soviet countries lacked experience for international migration since under the Soviet system migration was controlled through the allocation of jobs and housing. However, when the amount of illegal immigration was estimated as 7 to 15 million,22 Russian authorities adopted a new migration law to regulate the flow of migration with the right to set quotas on economic migration, and to forbid foreigners from engaging in retail market, and so on.

However, regulating illegal migration is quite a delicate matter for both the sending and receiving countries. At the same time, the matter requires coordination at the central, regional, and individual levels. The question of controlling illegal migration has become one of the main topics of the CIS foreign ministers and the SCO meetings. Russia introduced stricter measures in 2007, and Uzbekistan also introduced exit visas for those who wish to travel to Russia in 2005 (Laurelle 2007, p. 114). However, controlling illegal migration often involves economic interests and human right issues. For instance, about 500,000 migrants are financially supporting about 20% of the population of five million in Kyrgyzstan (Laurelle 2007, p. 116). Considering the economic conditions in Kyrgyzstan, the problem won’t be solved by simply tightening controls.

Tough measures such as deporting hundreds of illegal workers have often caused problems at the national level. As an appeasement gesture, Russian authorities often hinted that they would accept more foreign workers, which would in turn meet resistance from opposition political parties and regional authorities. The deporting of 100 Tajik seasonal workers in 2003 showed Moscow’s migration dilemma. Perhaps bearing the worries of Central Asian Countries in mind, Russian authorities announced that they favored more open immigration of foreign workers. As a practical measure, the Duma passed a law in 2004 to protect Tajik workers. The Duma also drafted a document in 2005 to enable Kyrgyz and Tajik workers to enter Russia on their external passports, which was rejected, mainly due to the objection of nationalist parties (Laurelle 2007, 114).

Such a development suggests that Russian authorities may have difficulty in subordinating migration policy to a grand national strategy based on traditional geopolitics or traditional/national security interests, particularly when strict migration

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21 Islamic extremist organizations such as ‘Hizb-Ut-Tahrir’ which are reportedly operating in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, are also supposedly responsible for terrorisms in Uzbekistan (Maksutov 2006, p. 12). Domestic instability is one reason Uzbekistan cooperates with Russia and has joined various interregional organizations.

22 According to the Federal Migration Service (FMS), illegal migration reached about 7-8 million, while politicians including Putin estimated the number to be about 10-15 million in Russia (Laurelle 2007, p. 204).
control may disrupt the living conditions of the general public in strategic partner states where labor migration plays a great role.\footnote{In 1995 Russian authorities yielded to the demands of regional governments and deported 10,000 Chinese from Primorskii. At that time, however, little damage was done to the strategic relationship between Russia and China. Portyzkov observed that China wanted to avoid problems that might hamper her relationship with Russia (Portyzkov 2006, p. 49).}

V. Perception Gap in Central Asian Migration

In the discourse of migration, a key issue is ethnic balance in a society. Emigration essentially indicates the ‘others’ coming into a society. Such ‘we’ and ‘them’ identification may emerge in the changing ethnic balance that started the relations between ‘we’ and ‘others.’ However, the existence of ‘we’ and ‘others’ does not necessarily develop into conflicts between the groups. A collective perception of ‘others’ may be converted into hostility, which could trigger real conflict between them during mobilization. In particular, the difference in the perceptions of the key migration issues appears more important than the reality, although reality may help bridge the gap between different perceptions. In fact, the same fact itself may produce different perceptions depending on position, level of analysis, and so on.

What are the key perceptions that bring meaningful differences in this context? According to existing studies, the perception of the economic aspect of migration such as perceptions of the competition of labor markets and the expectation of economic contributions at various levels affect ethnic hostility. Societal security discourse has concentrated on the cultural and social aspects of migration and economic perceptions.\footnote{For further discussion of the relations between economic valuations and interethnic hostility fears, see Alexseev 2003.}

At the same time perspectives from which threats are evaluated—e.g., national, regional, or individual perspectives—are also important. For instance, the perception of the ‘yellow peril’—Chinese migration—prevails in the Russian Far East, while it is often dismissed in the European part of Russia (Alexseev 2006, pp. 102-104; Larin 2005, p. 61). In this case, societal security threats are easily identified. In other cases such as Moscow, however, identifying societal security threats is difficult. First, it may not be easy to establish Moscow as a society although the city appears to be a prime destination for both legal and illegal migration, and thus it is experiencing changes in its ethnic composition.

Although the numbers vary depending on the source, illegal migration from the five Central Asian countries is estimated at about 2 million (Laruelle 2007, p. 105). Moscow reportedly accommodates about 1 million illegal migrants, or about 10% of its population. Accordingly the ‘we’ identity tends to be embraced by politicians. For instance, Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov called for stricter control over migration, insisting that 40% of the city’s crime is committed by immigrants, adding that if “we clean up the current system of migration, we will reduce crime in the city.”\footnote{RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 17, no. 197, (24 October 2007)} A survey on migration also suggested that the ‘we’ identity is growing in relation to migration.

Based on a survey of the current situation in Russia conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation in January 2003, only 4% of the respondents accepted migration as...
one of the most dangerous and worrisome problems.\textsuperscript{26} To the same question, a relatively larger proportion in Moscow replied that migration (about 7\%) was most dangerous. About 21\% of Moscow respondents believe that migration is a question with which Russia is unable to cope; the national average was 11\% for that same question.\textsuperscript{27}

VI. Conclusion

This study examined the implications of migration issues on regional stability in Russia and Central Asia by employing a societal security concept. This study made a brief review of the societal security concept and migration patterns in Russia and Central Asia. Discussion of the contending positions of central governments and the federal subjects of Russia lead to the following conclusions.

First, as the societal security concept suggests, conflicts between state and societal securities might become a source of regional instability. Since the late 1980s the Russian government has taken a dual-track approach to migration policies and tried to subordinate societal security to the national security. For instance, interregional mechanisms to control state borders and migration have been established, and by doing so, Russia has successfully maintained better relations with Central Asian countries. However, as higher priority is placed on strategic partnerships, particularly in dealing with the growing influence of the US in the region and terrorist activities, the Russian government is finding it difficult to ignore the needs of Central Asian countries and to liberalize migration control. Furthermore, replacement migration is also a solution to another security threat Russia is facing: population decline. However such approaches have been challenged by federal subjects like Moscow.

Second, economic migration prevails, and undocumented labor migration appears to be growing in Central Asia and Russia. Particularly in Russia, economic migration takes place not only at the international level but also at the domestic level. Such a development inevitably increases regional disparities in terms of the numbers of migrants accommodated by federal subjects, which in turn develops into regional disparities in perceiving migration issues. Such disparities may hamper coordinated efforts to control migration.

Third, societal security measures may take state-oriented measures as well. It would be difficult to identify whether state-oriented measures are implemented on the basis of either state or societal security concerns. In the case of Siberia and the Russian Far East where a relatively solid identity has been formulated, it is much easier to identify societal security threats and the nature of measures to deal with them. Difficulties have emerged to identify a society in the discussion of migration issues between Russia and Central Asia. However, the politicization process of societal security issues has been launched, as suggested in Moscow where emerging perception gaps and the objections of Moscow politicians to Putin’s migration policy are found.

Finally, it is noteworthy that societal security threats have also emerged in the sending countries as well. In particular, unilateral migration patterns may produce identity

\textsuperscript{26} http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/etbo30107/printable.
\textsuperscript{27} http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/etbo30107/printable.
crises when societies in the sending countries are verging on collapse as a result of brain drain and population loss. The increasing numbers of societies may complicate the domestic and international coordination process and thus threaten efforts to build regional stability.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


